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Abstract 
This essay deals with two questions: Is an internal pluralism of cultures 
compatible with the basic norms of a political order supported by principles 
of liberalism and democracy? Can societies remain integrated at the level of 
territorial political communities when they become increasingly mobile and 
open for international migration? Both questions are answered affirmatively, 
but with certain reservations against evolutionary optimism and 
cosmopolitan liberalism.  
Modernity has unleashed a dynamic of cultural homogenisation within 
nation-states, and at the global level, too. This has not eliminated cultural 
boundaries but rather turned them into political ones, charged with 
potentials for violent conflict. Liberal norms of tolerance are not strong 
enough to undermine the logics of nationalism and modern racism. New 
inclusive forms of democratic citizenship ought to represent rather than 
restrain internal cultural plurality, and at the same time provide incentives for 
boundary transgressions and against communal closure. 
With regard to the second question, there is a contradiction between the 
acceleration of international migrations on the one hand, and the need for 
stable and bounded membership in democratic polities on the other. This 
conflict can be resolved by developing transnational forms of citizenship 
which are based on territorial residence but allow for external, changing, and 
multiple forms of political membership. However, even if narrow conceptions 
of national sovereignty can be overcome, the national institutionalisation of 
social rights and the global gaps of unequal social citizenship still remain 
as the main obstacle for a universal right of free movement. 
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The following text was commissioned by Copen-
hagen University for the conference Rescue 43 to 
be held in October 1993 and for an edited volume 
to be published at the same date. The occasion 
of this conference is to commemorate the rescue 
of almost the entire Jewish population of Denmark 
from Nazi persecution fifty years ago. (About 
5000 Danish Jews were shipped to Sweden in 
small boats by Danish citizens within a few 
days). The general subject of the conference is 
xenophobia and exile today. The text is an 
essay, written for oral presentation. Footnotes 
and references to relevant literature have been 
used sparingly for that reason. 
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I. Political community and  
normative discourse 
Strategies for the future have to be built first on a proper understanding of 
the world today and second on an exploration of normative dilemmas. We 
have to face such dilemmas if we think that the future of societies can be 
shaped by present choices at the level of political communities. This 
presupposes a belief that the future is neither predetermined by the course 
of history, nor the random result of myriads of independent individual 
interactions, nor under the exclusive control of such dominant actors as 
ruling elites and classes. 
It is difficult to give rational reasons for such a belief. We can sustain it 
only where there is such a thing as a political community. I conceive of a 
political community in the strong sense of the word as one in which 
members share in collective decision-making on issues that affect them 
collectively. Most states in the present world fail dismally to meet this 
definition. Western-style representative democracy is not a form of political 
community either, if we characterize it with Joseph Schumpeter as »that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people's vote«.1 However, there are two elements missing in this 
definition which characterize liberal and constitutional democracy. The first 
is the institutional guarantee of extensive and inclusive rights of citizenship, 
and the second is the ongoing public discourse of legitimation of political 
decisions in terms of collective interests or consent of an imagined political 
community of citizens. It is not participation in decision-making but rather 
the communal distribution of citizenship as a social good which gives some 
residual credibility to the claim that contemporary democracies represent 
political communities. And it is within the discourse of legitimation rather 
than that of decision-making, that citizens can and in fact do raise 
normative questions about future options.  
None among us who does not exercise political power can know 
whether taking a position in public debates will lead to corresponding 
political decisions – and if it does, whether such decisions will be 
implemented effectively – and further, if they are, whether this will really 
change the course of social development in the desired direction. In a liberal 
state, we cannot even demand from all citizens that they participate in such 
debates, which may seem pointless to most of them. Humans are not by 
nature political animals. Aristotle could state the opposite only because he 
lived in a political community which supported this belief. Yet the same 
culture also supported his opinion that women are unfit for politics and that 
slaves are slaves by nature, i.e. naturally excluded from political 
communities. Liberal democratic political culture is at least potentially 
much more inclusive. But at the same time, it does not socialize most 
people into becoming political animals. Yet neither does it turn politics into 
an exclusive business of an aristocratic elite. Civil society contains a public 
realm which is open for participation in political discourse, even if not in 
most political decision-making. Those citizens which enter this arena 
cannot consistently avoid facing the normative questions that are the 
essence of public political debate in our societies. 
There are two such questions which come to my mind when I try to 
interpret the title suggested to me by the organizers of the conference: 
                                                                 
1 Joseph A. Schumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper Torchbooks, London, 
third edition, 1950, p. 269. 
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1) Is an internal pluralism of cultures compatible with the basic norms of a 
political order supported by principles of liberalism and democracy? 
2) Can societies remain integrated at the level of territorial political 
communities when they become increasingly mobile and open for 
international migration? 
It is easy to see why both questions are normative ones. Pluralism and 
freedom of movement carry positive value connotations as something which 
is desirable where it does not exist and should be defended where it does. 
The questions are relevant and difficult because they point to potential 
conflicts with other positive values attached to liberalism, democracy, social 
welfare and territorial integration. However, normative dilemmas such as 
these also involve implicit factual assumptions. The first question implies 
that cultural identities are important in modern societies; the second one, 
that international migration is a characteristic of the modern world. I think 
that the former assumption has to be defended while the latter is simply a 
statement of fact. 
II. Cultural Boundaries and the 
Dynamics of Nationalism 
In light of the statements just made, let me first consider whether cultural 
affiliations are still relevant in modern societies. Do the structures of 
contemporary Western societies and the dynamics of modernization 
multiply or reduce, reinforce or weaken internal cultural boundaries between 
social groups?  
Culture in the broadest sense of the word does not lend itself to the 
definition of clear-cut collective identities. The human species has the 
unique capacity to develop a potentially infinite number of communicative 
worlds differentiated from one another, on the one hand, and of codes for 
translation and communicative interaction among these worlds on the other. 
Our species has not separated into biological races with genetically-
conditioned different patterns of behaviour. More importantly, whatever 
genetic group differences exist, are irrelevant to this capacity for 
transcultural communication. We do not need metaphysics or religion to 
account for this. From her and his very origins, homo sapiens has been a 
migrating animal with the potential to adapt to a wide range of different 
natural and also cultural, i.e., human-made environments. Thus, humans 
have not only settled in all the different climatic zones of the earth: there 
has also been a constant stream of contact and exchange of populations 
among groups located in different territories. 
The differentiation of cultural worlds is a process of boundary-drawing, 
of distinguishing between us and them by means of cultural markers. If the 
boundaries were merely territorial ones marked by geographical obstacles, 
they would vanish with trade and conquest bringing formerly separate 
groups into close contact. As the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth 
has argued, the function of cultural boundaries is the stabilisation of group 
membership in constant cross-boundary interactions.  
In the pre-modern world, political and cultural boundaries normally did 
not coincide. The territorial shape of states was largely a result of war and 
conquest; and the maintenance of state power required superior military 
techniques of coercion and an economic surplus to be confiscated rather 
than a common language or religion for all subjects. The city-states of 
antiquity and the principalities of European feudalism were politically 
separate entities within much larger pools of common cultures. And, 
conversely, the empires of pre-modern societies encompassed a multitude 
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of different cultural communities which they normally left to care for 
themselves as long as they paid respect and tribute to political authorities. 
There are exceptions, such as China, where a high culture came to be more 
or less coextensive with a large core territory of an empire and where 
conquerors of the throne were assimilated into this culture. This seems to 
be due to an exceptional stability of rule based on a level of constant 
surveillance of society by a well-trained bureaucracy, which has only been 
surpassed in the modern welfare state. 
The economic and political revolutions which led to modernity have 
completely changed the significance of cultural boundaries. Cultural 
homogenisation at the level of states became essential for both the modern 
economy and the legitimation of political rule. An industrial divi sion of labour 
requires the socialisation of the entire population of internal markets in a 
common medium of communication. And this can only be provided by 
public education organized by the state. Thus, the correspondence of 
political and cultural boundaries became an imperative of the modern 
economy. This is, in a nutshell, Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism.2  
One should not interpret this thesis in a crudely functionalist and 
economistic manner. Political developments which led to modern 
nationalism began long before the industrial revolution. They paved the way 
for cultural changes which, in their turn, provided fertile ground for the 
emergence of capitalism. Most important was probably the process of 
secularisation of political authority, which had its oldest roots in the 
historical settlement between the Pope and Emperors in the 12th century 
and was probably initiated by the disaster of the wars and civil wars of the 
first half of the 17th century – a kind of suicide operation of the Western 
European feudal system. Immediately after that traumatic period, Thomas 
Hobbes developed the idea that worldly authority was ultimately legitimated 
only by the rational consent of the subjects over which it governs, and that 
its justification rests on the protection of the individual citizen from the 
threat of violent anarchy. Enlightenment, from John Locke to the French 
philosophers, revised the clauses of the Hobbesian social contract to 
include restraints on the power of governments to interfere with the property 
and rights of the citizens. Rousseau finally gave rebirth to the idea that 
political authority ultimately should rest in the general will articulated within 
a participatory political community. The failure of bourgeois democratic 
revolutions to realize this republican ideal, was not primarily due to political 
defeat and restoration of the old powers in most of 19th-century Europe. It 
was inherent to the organisation of state and economy that best 
corresponded with the interests of industrial and financial entrepreneurs, in 
contrast to the radical petty bourgeoisie and the nascent working class.  
A Rousseauian world would have consisted of a multitude of mini-
states within larger cultural communities homogenized by industrialisation. 
These small republics would have probably confederated themselves into 
larger units for the purposes of defence and could have established free-
trade zones. The only real historical possibility for this kind of development 
existed in North America before the adoption of the US constitution by the 
then-autonomous states. In the New World, the federalists won against the 
confederalists. In Europe, the final outcome of the dissolution of empires 
was the formation of large territorial states. Not only the national economies 
of scale of industrial capitalism militated against the survival of mini-states. 
An even higher threshold of viability was imposed by the requirements of 
external sovereignty during a period of unstable international alliances, 
which quite closely resembled the world postulated by the doctrine of an 
                                                                 
2  Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism. Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. 
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international state of nature. (This changed after World War II, which helps 
to explain the proliferation of independent states since that time). The 
modern nation-state which resulted from this was administered by a 
Weberian bureaucracy and governed by a political elite. Its political 
legitimation could not possibly be provided by direct democracy. National 
cultural community became the substitute definition for the demos with 
respect to which political authority must legitimize its power. The people of 
modern representative democracies, as well as of authoritarian states, 
became identified as one nation (or in rare cases, as several nations) – i.e. 
not as a demos but as an imagined ethnos which supposedly reproduced 
itself biologically because of a common descent, and culturally because of 
a shared language, tradition and historical experience. 
Modern societies can no longer exist as closed cultures with ethnic 
boundaries. Whatever cultural homogeneity exists at the level of nations, is 
state-manufactured rather than transmitted from one generation to the next 
by socialization within a self-sustaining milieu. But the ethnic substance of 
modern nations is a powerful myth. Its analytical deconstruction is rationally 
convincing and yet politically, rather impotent. The reason for this is that the 
modern Leviathan not only provides protection from violence for property-
owners by means of its monopoly of legitimate force; it also monopolizes 
the production of national culture which it distributes to all its citizens. This 
cultural capital is a resource for horizontal as well as vertical mobility. It 
promises opportunities to all those whose fortune is not built upon inherited 
assets. The welfare state which redistributes economic wealth to some 
extent, so as to provide a minimum of material protection to all citizens, has 
reinforced national attachments while simultaneously weakening the 
passions aroused by perceived threats to the cultural community. There is 
much more to defend for the ordinary citizens in the welfare state when 
compared to earlier forms of the nation-state. But that which is defended, 
depends on a smooth functioning of the economy and on political stability, 
rather than on a fight against rival cultural groups. 
Yet this whole logic of cultural homogenisation is strongly countered 
by the very dynamics unleashed when legitimation of political authority is 
derived from the self-determination of cultural units. Nationalism has opened 
windows of opportunity, not only for upward mobility of majority populations 
but also for minorities who felt repressed. Some of them stubbornly refused 
to be assimilated into the nation, some were deliberately excluded from it. 
Nationalism gave them another option. They could try to transform their own 
cultures into national ones. As the emergence of new states in Eastern and 
Central Europe and the possibility of separation in Belgium, in Canada, and 
in the Spanish and British state demonstrate, there is no final and stable 
result of nation-building. Nationalism contains two polar options for realizing 
its central imperative of making political and cultural boundaries congruent: 
assimilation or separation. Between these extremes there is a wide range of 
instable equilibria giving some collective rights or partial autonomy to 
minorities or nationalities within a nation-state. 
III. Racism and Ethnic Closure 
Nationalism is not the only modern ideology which redraws the map of 
cultural boundaries. Modern racism is a complementary but not identical 
phenomenon. It outbids ideas about the ancient origins of nations by 
ascribing the origins of groups identified as »races« to prehistoric natural 
selection. Secondly, it eliminates the threat of rival claims to equal national 
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honour on an ideological level by explaining historical relations of 
dominance as unalterable racial hierarchies.  
The victim groups of modern racism are those who find themselves in 
social positions where they lack the means to raise efficient claims to 
nationhood: the people of those colonies which provided slave populations, 
aboriginals in oversea territories which were used as an outlet for European 
emigration and settlement, the descendants of slaves in these countries, 
and territorially dispersed but ethnically distinct populations which had 
occupied specific positions in the economy of the European Middle Ages, 
such as Jews and Gypsies. The logic of racism is contrary to nationalism in 
its denial of the capacity of these groups for either assimilation or national 
emancipation. Racism replaces the nationalist options of assimilation, 
autonomy, or separation with the triad of segregation, expulsion, or 
extermination. 
Just as nationalism can be understood as a response to 
enlightenment ideas about the legitimation of political authority through 
social contract and republican democracy, racism is a reaction to 
enlightenment ideas about natural and universal human rights reaching 
beyond the boundaries of political communities. Enlightenment universalism 
posits humanity as a single community of individuals endowed with natural 
rights. At the same time, the external conquest of colonies – and the 
internal conquest of populations in the home territories for the purpose of 
nation-building – produces groups of outcasts who are denied the most 
basic human rights. Enlightenment universalism made it impossible to 
account for their difference in the way pre-modern societies had done. For 
them, phenotypic distinctions were probably just one kind of markers for 
cultural boundaries. If in modernity some populations could not be treated 
as human beings endowed with natural rights, they had to become 
stigmatized as subhuman. 
After the climax of the Endlösung der Judenfrage, racism has lost the 
aura of scientific truth. (The fact that racism was not cast out of the 
scientific arena before Nazism had been decisively defeated in the 
battlefields, teaches an important lesson to scientists). Nevertheless, 
racism is clearly still present in many different forms in Western liberal 
democracies. The most obvious ones can be found in the everyday 
discourse of private lifeworlds. French scholars have pointed out that new 
kinds of culturalist or differentialist racism have emerged which are mainly 
targeted against some groups of recent immigrants. These are confronted 
with a schizogenic double bind. On the one hand, they are asked to 
unconditionally surrender their cultural affiliations; on the other hand, their 
cultures are presented as unalterably alien and resistant to assimilation and 
as providing an innate identity which individuals cannot abandon voluntarily. 
The same impossible combination of demands was present in the 
discourses of anti-semitism in Central European societies after the political 
emancipation of Jews. What is still not fully developed in contemporary 
stigmatization of Muslim immigrants, is the final ideological escalation of 
the double bind before it eliminates any solution other than a violent one. 
This is the idea that those minorities are the most dangerous ones who 
appear to have successfully assimilated in spite of the impossibility of doing 
so. In racist fantasy, such assimilation can only be achieved by human 
viruses who infiltrate the body of the nation in order to destroy it from within. 
Many scholars have pointed out that everyday racist discourse is 
supported by institutional and structural racism which discriminates against 
stigmatized groups in the labour and housing markets, in the educational 
system and in the social services of the welfare state. This institutional 
racism has been conceived as a malevolent invisible hand which thwarts all 
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efforts of anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies. However, I do not 
think that racism is sustained merely by private prejudice and the operation 
of outwardly colour-blind mechanisms of markets and bureaucratic 
administration. I want to draw attention to what I perceive as discourses in 
science and politics supportive of post-Nazi racism. I characterize these as 
manifestations of second-order racism.  
First-order racism defends the theory that there are biologically 
different races which can be ranked in a hierarchy of human worth and 
capacities. In its political manifestation, it gives birth to explicit legal 
discrimination and exclusion from citizenship. On the level of scientific 
knowledge, second-order racism concedes that there is no hierarchy of 
human races but postulates instead a genetically-rooted tendency of all 
humans to discriminate against others in racist ways. Sociobiology, 
ethology and other theories offer different explanations for this hypothesis; 
and by no means should all of these be condemned as an expression of 
racism. However, they share a fundamental lack of understanding for the 
malleability of cultural boundaries, and especially for the social conditions of 
modernity under which the resources of territory and procreation have 
become utterly irrelevant for the status of individuals and social groups. By 
attributing to contemporary humanity a behaviour still shaped by conditions 
of survival in societies of hunters and foragers, they profoundly misinterpret 
the specifically modern features of racism and provide an exculpating and 
even legitimizing ideology for political compliance with racist exclusion. In 
other words, if racism is in our genes, politics had better take that into 
account and should not try to overburden the limited capacity of human 
groups to accommodate those perceived as aliens. 
In the field of politics, second-order racism can be detected in the 
discourse on representation of majority opinions. Democracy, we are told, 
requires from responsible politicians that they take into account even 
irrational fears and beliefs of the citizenry. The more honest variation of the 
argument is that those who do not take ordinary racism into account, will 
not be (re)elected and that this would pave the way for the real racists' 
access to public office. In its implications, this is first a self-reinforcing 
prophecy but secondly, a self-destroying one. It is self-reinforcing because 
it will lead to the adoption of policies which support the popular belief that 
racially discriminated groups represent a danger for majorities. It turns into 
a self-destroying prophecy when right-wing populists and racists who were 
meant to be kept out of office, are elected precisely because they are much 
more determined in the fight against Scheinasylanten, fundamentalist 
Muslim immigrants or criminality-prone blacks supported by public welfare 
benefits.  
Some commentators have maintained that there is still a lot of political 
first-order racism in the legal discrimination of immigrants. I do not accept 
that the mere control of immigration is in itself a manifestation of racism. 
But immigration regulations which have a negative bias against racially-
stigmatized groups can certainly be characterized in this way. A similar 
distinction can be made with regard to the treatment of immigrants within 
the country. The exclusion of long-term resident aliens from essential rights 
of citizenship, is a form of discrimination which must be seen as deeply 
problematic when measured by the standards of liberal democracy. As long 
as this distinction can be overcome individually by naturalisation, it is a 
manifestation of nationalism rather than racism. However, deterring 
immigrants from naturalisation and attributing a foreign nationality to 
children of immigrants without also offering them the citizenship of the 
country where they have been born, seems to me a kind of institutional 
racism. Making the status of foreign citizens an inherited one, supports the 
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idea that cultural identities are essentially inherited as well and transmitted 
by descent in a quasi-biological manner. 
I have said that minorities whose discrimination is racist rather than 
nationalist, cannot respond with a struggle for national emancipation. Of 
course, this is only true within given historical conditions. Colonial peoples 
who were exploited as providers of slave populations after World War II, 
eventually found themselves in a situation where they could successfully 
raise the claim to national independence. The predicament of those Jews 
who escaped the Nazi terror but could not find a safe haven elsewhere, was 
resolved in the realisation of the Zionist utopia – which, however, created a 
new homeless people. In South Africa, we witness the difficult birth of 
another nation which had been denied the right of self-determination by 
racist segregation. 
For those racially-discriminated minorities for whom no territorial 
solution and no new state is in sight, there appears to be another way of 
reacting to their continued social exclusion: cultural closure  and ethnic 
mobilisation. The ethnic cultures of immigrants and the ethnic revival among 
Afro-Americans (or African Americans, as the politically correct terminology 
now has it) should not be misunderstood as demonstrating the force of 
primordial attachments even in modern society. Of course, there are 
differences in cultural lifeworlds resulting from socialisation in countries of 
origin and reinforced by the experience of migration and of living in urban 
ghettos. However, just as nationalist myths reinvent and instrumentalize 
popular ethnic traditions rather than simply reflecting them, so do the 
manifestations of ethnicity in the public and political sphere with respect to 
the private cultural lifeworlds of an urban underclass. Politicized ethnicity 
has become a strategic asset for professional elites among minorities who 
militate against their own experience of discrimination and degradation.  
What was just discussed is a specific response to contemporary 
racism and xenophobia which presupposes a framework of equal formal 
citizenship. The Africanist turn in US black movements really took off only 
after the abolition of discriminating legislation. Ethnic and religious 
movements among immigrants from Latin America, the Southern 
Mediterranean or the Indian subcontinent are strongest in those countries 
where most have become citizens of their host states. While pre-World War 
racism meant exclusion from citizenship, contemporary forms can operate 
within the framework of equal rights. Yet the same framework also provides 
elites with opportunities to mobilize by claiming collective and corporate 
rights in addition to individual ones. The balance sheet of affirmative action 
and ethno-cultural education programmes so far is rather sobering. They 
have done more for emergent black or immigrant middle classes than for the 
bulk of the minority populations. Social citizenship in contemporary 
Western states is still strongly constrained by cultural boundaries which 
operate as thresholds in a generally unequal distribution of social 
opportunities. Ethnic mobilization and cultural closure is a strategy of 
instrumentalizing rather than abolishing these boundaries, and it will not 
lead to flattening the corresponding thresholds of social citizenship. 
Nevertheless, besides being a vehicle for the aspiring and upward moving 
strata of discriminated minorities, this strategy also has something to offer 
to those who remain marginalized: pride in what they are rather than in what 
they can become, collective identity as a substitute for social status. 
Let me sum up briefly the main points so far. Nationalism implies a 
dynamic of cultural homogenisation which destroys the self-reproductive 
capacities of ethnic cultures. Yet it also provides minorities and colonized 
people with opportunities of collective emancipation by claiming their own 
nationhood. Internal conflicts between rival claims can lead to assimilation 
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or separation. Often, they are settled by compromise solutions which 
establish ethnic minority rights or a kind of power-sharing within a pluri-
national state. Racism implies a denial of these solutions. Since 1945, 
racism has survived in the Western World in modified forms which 
perpetuate the social predicament of targeted groups but which also give 
them the opportunity to organize around demands for collective rights as 
ethnic minorities. 
IV. Liberalism, Democracy and 
Pluralism 
What are the implications of this diagnosis for the question raised at the 
beginning? There is a pluralism of cultures in most industrialized societies. 
It is not only a pluralism of private life-styles and cultural associations in 
civil society. Cultural battles are fought in the public and political realm as 
well. The principle of religious tolerance cannot be easily extended to other 
kinds of cultural distinctions, because transmission of politically potent, 
standardized high cultures has become a monopoly of the modern state 
disputed by rival claims. This makes for an uneasy pluralism loaded with 
explosive conflicts. 
Liberal and democratic philosophers often seem to ignore this. 
Nationalism is unattractive as a philosophical doctrine, but it is a force 
which has shaped modernity at least as much as liberal thought. While 
contemporary theories of distributive justice have thoroughly addressed the 
issue of economic inequality, most have tended to gloss over cultural 
boundary conflicts. Liberals often think of them as merely an anachronistic 
survival of the pre-modern world, whereas communitarians defend cultural 
boundaries indiscriminately as the very precondition for Sittlichkeit, for 
community-based morality. A proper understanding of the dynamics of 
nationalism would put philosophical minds to the task of defusing these 
ongoing conflicts. Rather than constructing a world in which such conflicts 
are absent, they should try to show how principles of liberalism and 
democracy can be used to de-escalate them. 
Contemporary liberalism has been criticized by the communitarian 
philosopher Michael Sandel as defending universalistic principles of justice 
from the viewpoint of a »disembedded self«,3 a rational individual who stands 
so far apart from all communal affiliations and particular histories that her or 
his moral judgement is not affected by them. I think this communitarian 
critique is both right and wrong. There are probably quite a number of truly 
disembedded selves in the real world of modern societies, but existentialist 
loneliness is certainly not what liberal universalists have in mind. When we 
make normative judgements which are meant to apply to a political 
community, we necessarily argue from a point of view of embeddedness, 
even if it is ideal membership in an ideal community. From this, it does not 
follow that in their normative judgements individuals are stuck in their 
present collective identities. Contemporary societies provide a much wider 
range of opportunities for abandoning, changing or combining cultural 
affiliations than did pre-modern ones. It is this experience which allows us 
to transcend communal affiliations in our normative political judgement in a 
way hardly conceivable before enlightenment. 
It is possible to defend the priority of liberty from the vantage point of 
abstract human beings stripped naked of their social status and life 
                                                                 
3 Michael Sandel: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
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histories. This is what John Rawls did quite successfully in his early work.4 
But it is difficult to defend a political order based on negative liberties to real 
human beings who communicate with each other, not behind a veil of 
ignorance but as members of ascriptive groups. Nevertheless, modernity 
creates a public sphere of society where a thin veil of ignorance is 
constantly present. Anonymous encounters and restrained communication 
in which private identities of partners remain veiled, fill a substantial part of 
our daily lives. Secondly, liberal principles can be defended from the 
perspective of the individual with multiple or changing affiliations, rather than 
that of a fictitious creature with no particular identity. I think of migrants and 
their spouses or of children of intermarriages between ethnic groups as test 
cases for pluralistic liberalism. These are minorities (and often minorities 
within minorities) but they represent the essence of what modernity means 
for vast majorities: both the force of social pressure and the range of 
opportunities from which broken, transitional and multiple identities emerge. 
In this view, a pluralism of cultures rather than a non-society of 
atomized individuals is the very condition for the legitimation of liberalism. 
However, not any kind of pluralism and culture can serve this purpose, but 
only one in which the weak principle of tolerance is supported by the 
stronger one of open boundaries allowing individuals to move between 
cultures and to change their own cultures from within. As Albert Hirschman 
has argued, the options of exit and voice do not necessarily contradict or 
erode loyalty. To the contrary, liberalism supports a constitutional 
framework in which individuals can be loyal to very different kinds of 
cultures, precisely because none of them enjoys a monopoly and because 
individuals have rights which enable them to change their communities from 
within – or alternatively, to change their communal affiliation by leaving. I do 
not think that most Western democracies are liberal – or liberal enough – in 
this sense. However, pluralistic liberalism could be an antidote to the kind of 
cultural pluralism produced by nationalism. 
Yet liberalism does not answer the real challenge of nationalism 
unless it also includes democratic principles. Collective self-determination 
is the idea shared by both democratic theory and nationalism, but generally 
ignored or criticized as illusory by liberal thinkers. Liberals have often 
confined themselves to establishing the autonomy of individuals and of civil 
society by limiting the scope of legitimate state intervention. What is 
essential for this end is the rule of law and the separation of powers within 
the sphere of the state. Excessive democracy could endanger all this, as 
well as the liberties of citizens. This is true but still evades the core problem 
of democratic legitimation. Nationalism cannot be overcome as long as 
there is no alternative definition of the demos represented by political 
authorities.  
This demos cannot be the one classical republicanism dreamt of: a 
uniform community of individuals directly participating in state power with no 
intermediate bodies between the citizen and the state. Most modern 
democracies are not only indirect and representative but also, to a 
substantial degree, corporatist and federated. The question raised by the 
existence of cultural and ethnic boundaries, is whether these should be 
represented at all, and how they can be represented in a manner that does 
not perpetually fuel nationalist rivalry or racist hate.  
As far as territorial national minorities are concerned, there is no 
alternative to specific collective rights including representation at the 
parliamentary and governmental levels. And where there is no more 
common political ground, separation is a better starting point for rebuilding 
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democracy than is a protracted political battle between national factions. 
However, only where relations have been of a colonial nature is separation 
inevitable from a democratic point of view. In all other relations, including a 
wide range of unequal and inequitable ones, separation means defeat for the 
project of constructing a democratic regime within which these inequalities 
could be overcome and where both communities could feel represented. 
Furthermore, as we now witness again in Central and Eastern European 
states, separation regularly produces new minority conflicts–often more 
violent ones than those which led to partition. Where ethnic populations are 
territorially dispersed, the principle of national self-determination by majority 
decision can lead to an endless chain reaction of separations and national 
unifications which only stops at the weakest link–one unable to defend itself 
against superior force or when national territories have been »purified« by 
ethnic cleansing. 
Democratic and socialist politicians who have seen this as a danger to 
their projects, as well as representatives of dispersed minorities, have 
advocated alternative solutions within existing states – such as collective 
rights based on individual group affiliation rather than territorial units, and a 
second parliamentary chamber where ethnic and national groups rather than 
social classes or ideological currents would be represented. Some of these 
proposals could have de-escalated conflicts during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia before war started. The difficulty with these ideas is that, in 
nationality conflicts, they promote an unstable truce rather than sustained 
peace. Within such constitutional settlements, political elites can increase 
their power by digging trenches along ethnic boundaries separating rival 
groups. Ethnic allegiance comes to dominate other forms of collective 
interests, and ideological pluralism within the ethnic camps will be 
suppressed. The settlement of the ethnic conflict in South Tyrol, which is 
certainly among the most successful ones, provides a good illustration of 
this skeptical view. For those who conceive of ethnic and national identities 
as primordial ones, the structuration of democratic political struggle along 
these lines is natural or even desirable. For others, like myself, who regard 
cultural boundaries as malleable and their identification with political 
communities as deeply problematic for the democratic project, these 
solutions cannot be accepted as permanent ones. 
I suggest that the best test for the democratic sustainability of ethnic 
representation is the same as for pluralistic liberalism: which position will 
those occupy who are newcomers from outside, who change their 
affiliations or who combine several ones? Any model that excludes them 
from the demos or does not represent them equally with members of 
institutionalized nationalities, fails to meet the norm of inclusivity which 
distinguishes modern democracy from pre-modern forms. Pluralistic models 
with entrenched divisions of power between established nationalities and 
linguistic groups, such as in Belgium or Switzerland, will make it even more 
difficult for immigrants from abroad or for internal migrants between regions 
and communities to feel equally represented. A republican »purification« of 
democracy in the French tradition, which excludes all national and ethnic 
identities from politics and transforms them into a uniform status of equal 
citizenship, is the wrong kind of answer. Minorities will only perceive it as a 
strategy of assimilation by a dominant nation. A better way of making 
cultural pluralism compatible with liberal democracy, is to outdo it by 
treating cultural communities as voluntary associations with special claims 
on representation in politics and public life, but denying them exclusive 
representation as to their membership. This could be achieved by taking 
into account collective rights for cross-cutting membership in social 
classes, genders, generations and regions – and by also representing 
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temporary identifications, syncretic cultures and shifting affiliations between 
communities. 
V. Freedom of Movement and 
Boundaries of Political Communities 
The second challenge that I read in the title of this paper, is whether the 
territorial integration of political communities can be compatible with 
international migration. It is easy to confirm the factual assumption implicit 
in this question. There can be no doubt that increasing international mobility 
is a basic feature of the contemporary world. Large-scale migrations have 
occurred during all historical periods, and modernity has dramatically 
reinforced this anthropological phenomenon. It has destroyed the economic 
foundations of sedentary cultures which had been rooted in subsistence 
agriculture. Previous great migrations in human history needed many 
generations to spread over the globe and were mostly collective movements 
of ethnic groups from one origin to one common destination. We can draw 
cartographic maps which capture the major movements during several 
centuries. If we did the same for today's world, we would get a confusingly 
dense web made from thousands of arrows connecting each country with a 
multitude of others.  
International migrations are such a pervasive phenomenon in modernity 
because they have so many different causes that any attempt to explain 
them within a single paradigm of migration theory must fail. People migrate 
involuntarily when they are forcefully brought elsewhere to perform work for 
which there is not enough, or not cheap enough, indigenous labour. Others 
migrate voluntarily because they lack subsistence at home or are attracted 
by the prospect of finding work abroad. Cultural, scientific and business 
elites migrate because this maximizes their opportunities or simply 
because it has become part of their life-style. Refugees migrate because 
they have been active as political dissidents or because they belong to a 
social or cultural group which has been targeted for persecution. Others flee 
when their towns and villages have become a theatre of war or when their 
societies are struck by endemic violence, mass poverty or ecological 
disaster. The only gross characterisation of long-term trends which can be 
given of all these different forms, is that while migrations have become ever 
more massive in terms of numbers of people on the move, mass migrations 
in the proper sense of the word, i.e. collective movements from one origin to 
one destination, have become more rare. The contemporary migrant is an 
individual rather than an element in a social mass; and the pathways of 
migration mostly depend on individual choices, even if for many these are 
extremely hard choices made under threat to their lives or livelihoods. 
State policies regulating migration are as manifold and divergent as are 
the individual motives for it. Governments have tried to expel certain people 
from their territories and have denied others the right to leave. Often, the 
very same governments did both simultaneously; and sometimes, they even 
did it to the same kind of people. Governments have also legalised the 
forceful displacement of labour from colonies. After the formal abolition of 
slavery, there followed the import of indentured labour; and both continue in 
many parts of the world. States have encouraged the recruitment of 
guestworkers and have attempted to repatriate them later or to shut the 
doors to their families and successors. All these forms of regulation still 
have one element in common: the modern state has insisted that it is 
entitled to control migration across its borders. A general denial of exit 
rights has been outlawed in human rights declarations and conventions, but 
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there is little indication that this is meant as a first step towards recognising 
a symmetric right of entry. Immigration control is a hallmark of state 
sovereignty in the modern world. Early modern states often were not able to 
enforce this control. During the brief period of 19th-century liberalism some 
were not willing to enforce it. The 20th century has witnessed a dramatic 
increase both in migratory flows and in state surveillance of persons on the 
move. However, there are exceptions which confirm rather than contradict 
this rule. States have abandoned restrictions towards certain immigrants 
which they consider as their own kin: Germany and Israel are the best-
known examples. It is a rather bitter irony of history that in the aftermath of 
Nazism and World War II, both German and Jewish diasporas have been 
offered a homeland where they will be welcomed as citizens as soon as 
they step over the border. This form of abandoning immigration control 
reinforces rather then diminishes national sovereignty. Yet there are other 
and more post-national developments as well. Freedom of migration, 
settlement and choice of employment within the European Community is 
perhaps the most interesting one. 
It hardly makes sense to conceive of freedom of movement as a 
natural right. Rights should be understood as attributing legitimacy and 
institutional protection to voluntary human actions and choices. Rights are 
thus a resource provided by political institutions for individual or collective 
autonomy. Human action which inherently infringes upon the opportunities 
of others to act in a similar manner, cannot be codified as a universal right. 
This is, for example, relevant to migrations which are instrumental for 
conquest. The same can be said of involuntary actions which directly result 
from such infringement, as do migrations into slavery or banishment. Only 
in modern times has the individual search for opportunities or protection 
become the dominant motive for migration. This is what gives plausibility to 
the idea that there should be a universal right of movement corresponding to 
the structural push-and-pull factors which force or induce millions of people 
to migrate. 
Industrial economy has uprooted masses from their lands and set 
them on the road to other places where they could find work. It is one of the 
major achievements of the liberal democratic state that it has established 
an internal right of free movement which corresponds to this structural force 
and which enables people to remain relatively autonomous in their territorial 
movements. Pre-modern empires and totalitarian modern states such as 
the USSR did not allow their citizens to move freely. Neither did the 
Apartheid state concede this right to its outcast black majority. Walls 
around cities characterized pre-modern restrictions on internal migration; 
and internal passport systems, modern ones. 
The dynamic of modernisation within modernity has led to forms of 
international migration which more and more resemble internal ones. So it 
would seem logical to demand as a next step the extension of the right of 
free movement from the national to the global level. If we also envisage the 
parallel emergence of a world state, this would be a simple augmentation of 
scale of an existing right without a change in its quality. However, there are 
very good reasons for neither expecting that a world state will be the 
eventual outcome of the contemporary globalisation of politics, nor for 
desiring such an outcome on normative grounds. Capitalism creates a world 
economy but, at the same time, reinforces obstacles for the dissolution of 
state borders. And despite the potential of international conflict inherent in 
this separation, we also should be aware that liberal democracy can only 
survive when there is a plurality of states. A world state would eliminate the 
exit option of leaving political communities and joining other ones, thereby 
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destroying a mechanism essential for systemic self-correction within an 
environment of competing organisations. 
International migration will by definition always be a movement 
between distinct political entities and the status of membership in these 
entities; will be different for those who are resident, those who have just 
arrived, and those who live outside. These distinctions are necessary for the 
stabilisation of political communities. But they do not in themselves justify 
restrictions on migration. Federal units within nation-states are able to 
maintain their autonomy and regional legislation with open internal borders 
for aliens, citizens of the federal state, and their own residents alike. The 
EC is confident that it can do the same even before becoming a federal 
state. 
I want to argue that a right of free international movement is indeed a norm 
inherent in the dynamic of modernity, which is not per se incompatible with 
the integration of bounded political communities. Realizing this goal would 
mean abandoning distinctions between citizens and non-citizens at borders 
and in the access to internal markets and state institutions. The only 
distinction which would be relevant in this utopia of modernity, is that of 
political membership. The present situation is, however, different. A 
universal right of free movement is not only utopian but could indeed 
undermine the stability and scope of democratic citizenship under 
conditions of class and global inequality. In the contemporary world, control 
over immigration is necessary to some extent; but at the same time, the old 
forms of distinguishing citizens from non-citizens have been partially 
eroded, and remaining forms of discrimination have lost their democratic 
legitimation. Although utopian, the plea for free movement is nevertheless 
relevant as a guideline for present policies. It supports the extension of 
immigration rights for specific groups of immigrants and the creation of 
regions of free international movement wherever this is compatible with the 
maintenance of internal democratic citizenship. 
The argument is summarized briefly as follows: in a utopian world of 
free migration, democracy is only possible if political communities have a 
determinate membership which has some stability in space and time. Not 
everybody everywhere in the world can participate in a meaningful way in 
discourses and decisions relevant for a limited collective of concerned 
persons. Political decisions are also binding over time. Democratic 
legitimation can only be achieved if those who will be affected in the future, 
are identical with those who participate as members now. If future 
generations are concerned, they should at least be well represented by 
those involved in the decision. Long-term territorial residency is the most 
obvious criterion for distinguishing those who will be strongly affected by 
many political decisions, from others who will be affected only indirectly or 
not at all. It is not necessarily the only criterion which can be applied. 
Decisions which affect populations beyond a national territory can and 
should involve these populations, at least at the level of public discourse. 
Migrants who are continuously on the move need not be excluded either, if 
they can relate to one or several locations as their homes. Where political 
communities are not themselves nomadic, a home will be essential for 
being represented as a member. 
In the contemporary world, democratic citizenship is constrained by 
structural social inequality; but, at the same time, it is a means of 
sheltering political communities to some extent from the effects of this 
inequality. The social component of citizenship rights which was first 
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analysed by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall in 1949,5 is essential for a 
meaningful integration of workers and women. Without social rights to 
education and to material welfare, women would be largely confined to the 
private sphere of family households. Workers – who would be fully exposed 
to the risks of unemployment, unregulated wages, working conditions and 
working hours – could not be citizens in a more than completely passive 
sense, either. There is a discrepancy between the internationalisation of 
labour markets and the national institutionalisation of social rights. Where 
social rights are absent or residual within a national economy, there is little 
justification for strongly restricting immigration. Where social rights are 
extensive and roughly similar – as well as transferrable – between different 
states, there is also no good democratic reason for maintaining obstacles 
for free movement. While neoliberals would probably advocate the former 
road towards more liberty of migration, I would support the latter one. 
The right of free emigration is a precondition for democratic citizenship. The 
absence of this right is a litmus test for totalitarianism. As there are no 
more uninhabited territories on earth which could be used for human 
settlement, does not free emigration imply a corresponding obligation of 
states to admit those who make use of this right by leaving? I think it does; 
but in a world of many different states, the obligation does not fall on any 
particular one, but rather on the community of states as a whole. If this 
community is not itself a world state, it will lack the means to enforce 
compliance of any single member with the obligation. Hence, this objection 
to restricting voluntary immigration in order to protect the present forms of 
democratic and social citizenship, simply does not hold. However, it is 
convincing where migrants are not really free to choose another state of 
destination. States can have specific obligations to admit groups of 
particular migrants. Refugees, whose human rights will be endangered if 
they are kept out, are generally in this category – and so are family 
members of migrants who are already established in a country. The 
increasing flows of family and chain migrations, as well as of refugees, 
provide another argument for demanding coordinated efforts among the 
wealthy states to receive more immigrants instead of closing their gates. 
However, claiming entitlements of immigration or at least priority of 
admission for these groups, implies that controlling or restricting other 
migrants is legitimate as long as there are sufficient reasons for an overall 
limitation of numbers. As far as immigrants are concerned who are not in a 
priority category, one can nevertheless use democratic norms to argue 
against discriminating treatment. Fair procedures instead of arbitrary 
discretion – and quantitative limitation rather than qualitative selection – 
should be the main guidelines. 
Let me finish by explaining why present criteria of determining political 
membership are problematic from a democratic point of view. I suggest that, 
in liberal democracy, the distribution of membership should follow that of 
citizenship rights and not the other way around. In the nationalist 
construction of the demos, individuals are first members of a people. 
Secondly, they exercise as a collectivity a single right which is constitutive 
for their definition as a nation: the right of national self-determination. 
Thirdly, in democratic nation-states there may be additional individual rights 
of citizenship which are, however, not constitutive for political membership 
in the national sense. Determination of membership in the nation is 
automatic (by descent from members, or by birth in the national territory, or 
by some combination of both). Admission of those who are not members by 
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birth is regulated by an asymmetric contract in which state authorities both 
lay down the minimum conditions for application and reserve for themselves 
the final decision whether or not to grant citizenship. National citizenship 
generally excludes simultaneous membership in other national communities 
which are constituted as sovereign states. 
An alternative concept of liberal democratic citizenship starts by 
determining the proper distributive ranges of citizenship rights. We can 
postulate two normative criteria. The first is the liberal principle of 
institutional protection with maximum freedom of choice for those actions 
which do not harm others and which are compatible with equal protection 
and freedom for all. The second is the democratic principle of maximum 
congruence between the set of persons affected by political decisions and 
involved in the political process leading to decision-making. While the first 
principle is universal in its range of validity, it is de facto limited in its 
enforceability by the spatial and temporal range of state institutions. The 
democratic principle is inherently limited by the different ranges of impact of 
collectively-binding decisions. 
In this view, membership is no longer a dichotomous concept. The 
resident population as a whole is the set of members which are entitled to 
basic rights of passive citizenship: among them, most civil and social 
rights. Resident adults above a certain age constitute the proper set of 
citizens enfranchised for political rights. Persons who stay temporarily 
abroad but who maintain strong ties with their country of former residence, 
enjoy external rights of citizenship: among them, diplomatic protection and 
the right to return migration.  
In contemporary Western democracies, civil and social rights have 
been substantially extended to include resident aliens. Political rights of 
voting and access to public office, as well as external citizenship, are still 
mostly confined to national citizens rather than to resident populations. 
There are some notable exceptions, such as communal voting rights for 
foreign citizens in several European states and an »option of return« for 
second-generation foreigners who have temporarily left their country of 
residence. 
The single most important step towards a transnational concept of 
citizenship would be a general recognition of dual or multiple citizenship and 
the introduction of unconditional rights of naturalisation after a minimum 
period of residence. There are also other developments pointing beyond the 
national definition of political membership, such as the European 
Community citizenship agreed upon in the Maastricht treaty. I also conceive 
of human rights legislation as an extended form of citizenship if there are 
international institutions for jurisdiction and instruments for enforcing 
sanctions against governments. 
In a world organized along the lines of liberal democratic citizenship, 
many individuals could be members of different political communities 
simultaneously or in temporal sequence. This multiplicity of membership 
would be mainly a result of an inevitable incongruity between territorial 
states, on the one hand, and increasingly mobile populations on the other. 
Overlapping circles of individual membership would correspond with 
overlapping areas of collective sovereignty exercised by states.  
Would transnational citizenship endanger internal democracy? It would 
remove obstacles to the representation of migrant populations. I cannot see 
why this should not also be welcomed by those who want to make present 
forms of democracy not only more inclusive but more participatory, too. 
Would overlapping sovereignty threaten the external autonomy of states? 
Nationalism has enabled oppressed colonial peoples or ethnic minorities to 
break relations of political dependency by creating independent states. 
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Transnational citizenship would increase interdependency between states 
rather than reintroduce dependency. An interdependent world of separate 
states without equally separate citizenries would be probably less ridden 
with international conflict than the present one. However, it would be naive 
to think that the transformation of citizenship can in itself be a sufficient 
strategy towards realizing this goal. On the national level the partial 
containment of class inequality by social rights has been the most 
important precondition for enriching national citizenship with democratic 
elements. The same is true for the international level. As long as extreme 
differences of collective poverty and wealth persist between separate states, 
there is little chance of building stable bridges of transnational citizenship 
between them. 
